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History and politics after the end 
of the Cold War
The epigram consists of two sentences 
that a historian could never have uttered, 
no matter what the challenge from his in-
terlocutor might have been. The historian 
seeks to understand how the past weighs 
on the present; he highlights the historic-
ity of the present, yet without weighing up 
his work on the basis of dubious political 
assessments which he posits axiomati-
cally. Were he to do this, it would amount 
to an act of subversion not only of his own 
work but of the work of historiography 
in toto as a positive social value, or even 
more, it would be a violent political misap-
propriation of history. Since the late nine-
teenth century the gradual domination of 
mass democracy has created a functional 
split between the world of politics and the 
world of scholarship. Politics is based on 
value judgments and preceptive formula-
tions. Historians, on the contrary, calibrate 
their mental activity so as to comprehend 
reality itself as much as possible. The re-
jection of the reification of the social world 
lies at the core of the historical vocation.2 
The historian shows that the things that 
surround us are traces of human activity in 
the past and therefore he seeks to animate 
those traces, to uncover and describe the 
faces that created them.3 Empathy, not in 
the sense of identification but in the sense 
of a careful and meticulous observation, is 
the foremost and most binding condition in 
the historian’s route. Although the retro-
spective view is a clearly insurmountable 
obstacle for the attainment of full empathy 
with the history he is trying to understand, 
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The debate on communism 
smells of mothballs. Communism 
no longer exists either as a 
social or an economic practice 
or a political proposition or an 
ideological vision.
— Stathis N. Kalyvas1
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he never ceases to strive to that end. Besides, he needs a lengthy amount of time in order to 
carry out his research; hence he always places himself at a temporal instance from the timeli-
ness that changes daily. The ungerminating language of “the end of” this or that or of whatever 
is of no concern to the historian, unless he has decided to change job and append himself prof-
itably to his contemporary state of things. 
One further problem which springs from the reification of the past is that it offers the observer 
the opportunity to make short work of concepts, philosophical currents and social and political 
movements, replacing them without hesitation with the political regimes which were supposed 
to represent them and now are extinct. After the fall of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, 
especially among less sophisticated scholarly communities, the tendency was widespread to 
dispose summarily not only of whatever had been associated with those regimes but also of 
everything that Marxism stood for, and especially its relation to the idea of revolution. This ten-
dency stands at the opposite of the line of the Bloomsbury Set, which, in an era that was also 
turbulent and transitional, argued that “nothing mattered except states of mind, our own and 
other people’s of course, but chiefly our own . . . consisted of timeless, passionate states of con-
templation and communion, largely unattached to ‘before’ and ‘after’”.4 
In the case of contemporary approaches, “before” and “after” demarcate spaces that do not com-
municate with each other, and thus the student of history finds no reason to feel the splits and 
turning points and to interpret them; he finds it sufficient to ascertain and enhance them, to turn 
them into insurmountable barriers even for his own endeavour. In so doing, supporters of such 
undifferentiated generalisations in history or in the social sciences deliberately forgot that Marx-
ism never insisted that it introduced a new philosophy or a new concept of man, since it derived 
its foundation from Hegel’s philosophy, which it aimed to turn into reality. If therefore one makes 
short work of Marxism, one should also do likewise with Hegel, with philosophy itself, and final-
ly with the world as we have contemplated it. And yet, why has this point, which in the last few 
decades has been the strongest barrier to the postmodern, in the Greek case of the “new wave” 
historiography not been dealt with even as a hint of a problem? Why did the Greek “new wave” 
have such an easy ride in spreading itself? 
The ‘revival of history’ vs. ‘historical thinking’: introducing the Greek ‘new wave’ 
For the past ten years or so, Greek historiography on the 1940s – a decade marked by war, de-
feat, occupation, resistance and civil war – has had to grapple with a new approach which calls 
itself the “new wave”. In an intellectual and epistemological juncture which naively claims that 
the only task of each era towards history is to rewrite it, in the case of contemporary Greek his-
toriography the task is discharged through the renovation and restoration of older frameworks 
and interpretative schemes relating to the history of the pivotal 1940s. The chief agents of this 
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self-styled “new wave” are political scientists Stathis N. Kalyvas (Yale University) and Nikos Ma-
rantzidis (University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki). The venture began with a paper presented by 
Kalyvas at a conference on the Greek Civil War held at King’s College London in 1999,5 and car-
ried on with the publication of a book chapter entitled “Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the 
Occupation” in 2000,6 and then took on the form of a ten-point manifesto published in the mass-
circulation Athens daily newspaper Ta Nea in March 2004.7 There followed three books which, 
according to political scientist and historian Ilias Nikolakopoulos, comprise the “trilogy of mud-
dle”:8 the first book deals with armed bands which mainly collaborated with the occupying pow-
ers during the Second World War;9 the second book is the publication of a subsequently altered 
version (by the diarist himself) of the diary of a Communist Party notable, Dimitris Vlandas, cov-
ering the years 1947–1949;10 and the third with the historiography of the Greek 1940s bearing 
the equivocal and unwarranted title Η εποχή της σύγχυσης [The age of muddle].11 
The thrust of the new wave is deceptively simple. As the old rightwing narrative would have it, 
albeit more crudely, Greece in the 1940s had faced a dramatic groundswell of popular support for 
the National Liberation Front (EAM), created by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) in 1941; yet 
that support was founded mainly on the violence and terror which the communists had visited 
on opponents, waverers and bystanders. Greek history in that decade can be summed up in the 
“three rounds” of the determined communist attempt to seize power by force of arms in 1943–
1944, in December 1944 and in 1946–1949. Although by 1949 the Left had lost the political and 
military struggle, subsequently it succeeded in establishing its own historiographical orthodoxy 
for nearly half a century, until the “new wave” came in to put things straight and obliterate those 
rosy leftist narratives about freedom-loving national liberation fighters. With few exceptions, 
the controversy generated by this “new” – or, as it also calls itself, “postrevisionist wave”12 – has 
focused on the sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit ideological and political coordinates 
of the venture. In large part this is due to the fact that with a noteworthy frequency, the views of 
the “new wave” are buttressed by a regular shower of shorter pieces by Kalyvas and Marantz-
idis, published in the Sunday press, which offers good opportunities to charm the unsuspecting 
and enlist those ready to accept the “new” truth of the “new wave”. 
In such a short piece by Kalyvas from March 2009, wholly representative of the “new” paradigm 
and style, the self-referential narcissism of the “new wave” is encapsulated in the contention 
that in the domain of Greek historiography on the 1940s there have been only three “leaps” to 
the truth: the first was a collaborative volume edited by John O. Iatrides in 1981;13 the second 
was Mark Mazower’s book on Greece during the Axis occupation, published in 1993;14 the third 
“leap” is the emergence of the “new wave” which appeared in 1999–2000 and is going strong to 
this day. Numerous scholars who studied the Greek 1940s in between these great “leaps” have 
to this day being wasting themselves on “sterile questions which were more closely related to 
the metaphysical anxieties of the Left than with the demands of research” – the latter now being 
clearly stipulated by the “new wave” – with the result that “myths and clichés that from a schol-
arly point of view have been totally devalued are incessantly regurgitated”:15 the reader is not 
privy to any information about how, when and by whom all that had gone on before has been 
“totally devalued”, unless the alert reader is expected to feel that the self-referential narcissism 
of the “new wave” offers the glaringly obvious answer; and it probably is, because, according to 
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Kalyvas, the research, publications and conferences of the “new wave” have set off its “dominant 
role ... in the formulation of the research agenda”.16 
Still, persistence in a controversy that privileges the political or ideological or even stylistic fea-
tures of the “new wave” discourse tends to cloud the fundamental weakness of the venture – its 
theoretical, methodological, analytical and normative practices which fundamentally subvert its 
scholarly credibility.17 
Politics and contested histories in Greece
The political and intellectual juncture in which the “new wave” venture came to unfold its ap-
proach was instrumental in determining in large part the gravity with which its views were in-
vested in the context of Greek historiography on the 1940s. Contemporary politics and contem-
porary history have been closely related, though in a nonlinear manner. The history of the 1940s 
was about the essence of politics, and the politics of the post-civil war period derived part of its 
content and legitimacy from that history of the 1940s. Until 1974 a rightwing version predomi-
nated, but a leftist rival did exist and did have its audience among leftist circles in Greece and in 
the communities of the Greek communists exiled in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after 
the end of the civil war in 1949.18 The domination of the Right was more historiographical and 
less cultural. After the “metapolitefsi” (the “political changeover”) of 1974 and the fall of the mili-
tary dictatorship which had been established seven years earlier, the Left was politically rep-
resented by three segments – the social-democratic Pasok, the orthodox Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE) and the splinter KKE Esoterikou (Internal) which distanced itself from the pro-Mos-
cow mother party. Each of the three leftist parties cherished and projected a rival version of the 
past. At first glance, the common thread among these three leftist versions was the rejection of 
the rightwing narrative of a triple attempt by the KKE to come to power by force of arms in the 
1940s and offer the country as a prize to communist Slavdom and Joseph Stalin. The Pasok ver-
sion condemned the deeds of the Right in the 1940s but also the “mistakes” of the communist 
leadership; the KKE Esoterikou version was similar to the Pasok rendition, the main difference 
being the dosage of communist leadership “mistakes”. As for the orthodox version of the KKE, 
it did vary according to national politics and innerparty politics, and at times de-emphasised the 
more divisive experience of the civil war of 1946–1949 in favour of the more “unifying” experi-
ence of the “national” resistance to the Axis occupiers in 1941–1944. This was especially the 
case with the KKE version of the 1980s; since the 1990s the party has gradually shifted towards 
stressing the national-liberation credentials of communist action in the 1940s not only in terms 
of the resistance but also in terms of the civil war, while currently it is veering towards a more 
revolutionary correct narrative.
After the end of the civil war in 1949, the Greek Left salvaged from the events of the 1940s a si-
lent cultural narrative of heroism and defeat, while the victorious Right clenched the politically 
and socially dominant narrative of victory. Since the metapolitefsi of 1974 the Greek Right has 
found it increasingly difficult to uphold its narrative, as political and scholarly conditions became 
favourable to an academic study of the 1940s. For more than two decades such studies rendered 
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increasingly untenable the victor’s narrative and established schemes of periodisation and inter-
pretation that appeared more supportive of a “leftist” edifice. The “historians’ debate” that was 
inaugurated with the publication of the “new wave” manifesto in March 2004 was an assault on 
the only thing that the Left had kept from the 1940s. 
Yet, despite the charges of the “new wave”, there was nothing odd or uncommon about the 
dominance of a leftist narrative on the Greek 1940s. Especially in the postwar era, the relation-
ship between history and politics has been a complex adventure: the historical narrative was of-
ten forced to resort to temporary and unstable forms, albeit especially interesting, since it was 
dominated and almost repressed by restrictions dictated by politics. On the other hand, Marx-
ism was a very flexible analytical tool when dealing with the concepts of revolution and history; 
hence Marxism was a tool friendly to the scholar who did not only want to ascertain “the end” of 
history and summarily entrench himself in his academic discipline. It was a flexible tool mainly 
to the extent that the concepts Marxism used for the interpretation of history were philosophi-
cally ambivalent. In his lectures at the École Nationale d’Administration, Raymond Aron used to 
say of Marxism that, on the one hand, there was revolution as a rationally necessary develop-
ment and, on the other, there was revolution as the inescapable course of history.19 This created 
possibilities for interpreting the facts in a manner that equated the credibility of Marxism with the 
credibility of history. In 1947 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his Humanisme et Terreur,20 referred to 
Leon Trotsky’s last thoughts on the question of the revolution. Trotsky believed that if after the 
Second World War the proletariat did not seize its destiny in its own hands, thereby realising a 
revolution that would be the prelude to the abolition of classes and of nations and the first step 
towards world socialism, then one would have to conclude that the Marxist proposition on the 
socialist revolution that would resolve the contradictions of capitalism was ultimately a propo-
sition which history had belied. Merleau-Ponty, who wanted to continue to believe in Marxism, 
commented on Trotsky’s views that it was history that had been wrong and that the only correct 
way to face history was through the prism of Marxism.21 The non-Marxist Aron said of the revo-
lution that did not happen that it would be equally valid to conclude that either history or Marx-
ism had been wrong.22 
In an analytical framework equally fluid and with the Greek juncture of the 1940s bearing some 
of the hallmarks of a revolutionary period, the discourse of the Left on the civil war could unhur-
riedly invest in the fulfilment of the Marxist vision. The inevitability of revolution could not be put 
in doubt, therefore Marxism was ideologically and morally strengthened, while as a rationally 
necessary development, a Greek Civil War-cum-revolution absolved history from having been 
wrong. Depending on the standpoint of each observer, defeat could be ascribed as a mistake or 
as a failure or even as treason perpetrated by the historical agents; but whatever the exegesis, 
what was truly important had indeed occurred, history was innocent and the Marxist discourse 
on revolution had been fulfilled. In its Greek version, the post-Second World War juncture bore 
all the characteristics of a revolution that had failed23 and historians could portray it with the “ad-
mirably equivocal” terms of Marxism.24 The “revolution” came after disasters which augured sal-
vation, disasters that were fertile and redemptive, disasters that affected equally devout Chris-
tians and university graduates, those who believed in the vengeance of the wretched and the 
poor and in the overthrowing of social values, but also those who believed that science and ra-
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tional organisation could influence decisively the course of mankind. When the time was right, 
the Left could construct its narrative on the 1940s and make it dominant, because it located it-
self in a space where political defeat and political victory could have no other impact on it but to 
strengthen it, since political defeat and political victory were the dialectical opposites of a politi-
cal act that had been undertaken.
Even so, the “new wave” claim that the leftist domination of the historiography on the 1940s is a 
Greek aberration was no accident. It was related to a juncture which, a decade after the collapse 
of the socialist order in Eastern Europe, sought the ironing out of all European exceptions, aber-
rations and irregularities in view of the intensification of a Europe-wide process of closer but ever 
utilitarian integration through leveling. It was more or less at the same time that French histori-
ography settled its account with the history and the memory of Vichy,25 and while simultaneously 
denouncing itself as the last Stalinist historiography in Europe, it took care to rid itself both from 
the national “founding myth” of the French Revolution and from the communist illusion. Thus the 
persistence on a “leftist” historiographical reading of the 1940s as a Greek aberration and the 
focus of the “new wave” on this feature came to respond to a social demand: a seemingly schol-
arly view of the past was needed to validate what the future would bring, without any footnotes 
about possibilities, missed opportunities or alternative choices and outcomes. In the “new wave” 
framework it was this problem that decided the balance – indeed, the dosage – between schol-
arly research and the satisfaction of the social demand. Research must be shaped in a manner 
that does not cast doubt on its scholarly credibility. This, in turn, corresponded to a modicum of 
veritable scholarly endeavour, since the very aim of scholarly credibility was served primarily by 
the academic titles and credentials of some of the architects of the “new wave”. These creden-
tials and titles were repeatedly and ceremoniously screened by the mass media, while to some 
degree they were used by the “new wave” authors themselves in order to prop up the credibil-
ity of their propositions. Still within the same framework, scholarly activity should state its find-
ings in a manner that does not simply respond to social questions but actually overpowers and 
abolishes them; and to do this it has had to attune itself to the cacophony of the mass media, to 
learn how to bypass memory, to minimise empirical evidence and ultimately to shrink theoreti-
cal contemplation. 
From ‘revisionism’ to ‘postrevisionism’ and ‘new histories’
These practices have recently peaked in Η εποχή της σύγχυσης [The age of muddle], which so far 
is the most ambitious attempt of the “new” and “postrevisionist” “wave”. In the first instance, the 
use of the terms “postrevisionism/postrevisionists” both by those who embrace it and by some 
of their critics is mechanistic and ultimately misleading. Referring to the latter, Nikos Marantz-
idis correctly points out that the critics of the “new wave” often identify local history studies with 
“‘revisionism’ (which obviously recalls those who dismiss Nazi crimes) and with ‘postmodern-
ism’”, to add, equally correctly, that if “this is not a case of extreme deviousness, it is [a mark 
of] deep ignorance and [of] an inability to understand the debate”.26 It is largely the latter, but at 
this point it is essential to clarify a certain measure of ambiguity in the relationship between the 
modern and the postmodern. 
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In its later phase the postmodern has often sought refuge in a “new” modern, in a pattern that 
was familiar both to broader audiences as well as to academic tribes; it is a pattern that can more 
easily promote its vacuousness under a gloss of “progress”. The Greek “new wave” appears to 
have acceded to that version of the postmodern when in its manifesto it posits itself as “new” 
and, upon closer inspection and in relation to the history of postwar Greece, it is obliged to define 
as modern that which followed the defeat of the Left in the civil war. This assertion is explicitly 
made by Kalyvas, who celebrates the fact that 
the entire Greek society escaped the pathology of underdevelopment which continues to 
plague the majority of the world’s population. Today it is obvious that the “grey years” of 
postwar Greece were the most crucial years of the country’s leap and, paradoxically and 
ironically, the defeat of the Left in the civil war was a prerequisite for that.27 
This quotation illustrates the precipitate attempt of its author to uncover the terms of a new mo-
dernity in postwar Greek society. The defeat of the Left in the civil war is enlisted in a game of 
provocations and defiance which the “new wave” right from the outset was determined to play 
in order to climb up the ladder of Greek historiography. Yet the concept of the “grey years” of 
Greece’s “leap” is much more interesting with regard to the origins of the “new wave” itself. The 
concept is used to bring back the idea of the “modern” in the empty space created by the negation 
of modernisation, socialism and industrialisation (specifically with regard to heavy industry), in 
other words the negation of all those concepts that have lost their appeal since the late 1980s.28 
Interestingly, they lost their appeal not only because they were associated with aspects of the 
Stalinist version of modernisation that was universally repudiated, but also because western 
thought took care to characterise in toto Marxism and socialism in their very nature as negative 
“Promethean” ideologies.29 Yet because it is difficult to formulate an attractive political impera-
tive after the “end of history”, and having excluded from one’s political thought the dimension 
of the future and of radical change (if not of progress itself), then a new “modern” instead of the 
suspect “postmodern” should be posited. The new “modern” in reality preserved only the exter-
nal outline of what modernism had once been, so that the well-established western “paradigm” 
might continue to prevail.30 
Thus the ambiguity of the concepts that permeate the vocabulary of the “new wave” extends also 
into epistemological issues. To cite one instance, it is at least a dubious minority view that the 
concepts of objectivity and interpretation are mutually contradictory or that “the modern histori-
ographical tendencies” put the concept of “objectivity” into question;31 a far more precise formu-
lation would be that they tried to do so but failed, as John Lewis Gaddis, a neighbour of Kalyvas’ 
at the History Department of Yale University, argues convincingly.32 
A similar problem is associated with the use of the terms “postrevisionism” and “postrevision-
ists”. These terms are derived from American – and certainly not British – historiography and 
denote something that is very specific: the interpretative paradigms of American historiography 
on the “Cold War”, which began with the “orthodox/traditionalist” school that blamed postwar 
developments on Soviet ideological and geostrategic expansionism; carried on with the “revi-
sionists” who blamed it all on American economic imperialism; and then ended up with the large, 
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diffuse and diverse wave of “postrevisionists”, who include the full range from crypto-orthodox 
to crypto-revisionists plus all the intermediate nuances and varieties. It is therefore hard to du-
plicate in Greek historiography the original “postrevisionism”, for the real thing includes a wide 
spectrum of approaches, paradigms and interpretations, from Michael Hogan’s corporatism to 
Melvyn Leffler’s national security model, and from Michael Hunt’s ideology to Jessica Gienow-
Hecht’s cultural transfer and Kristin Hoganson’s gender approach.33 Greek “postrevisionism” 
seems to have a long way to go since at present it identifies only three common threads in its 
venture: the turn to the “mass level” and “the view from below”; interdisciplinarity with the pump-
ing of working hypotheses and analytical tools from history, political science, cultural studies, 
sociology and social psychology; and the lack of any connection between these approaches and 
any “concrete ideology, faction or party”.34 
As regards interdisciplinarity, surely “autonomy is not the same thing as exclusiveness or self-
sufficiency”,35 but this should not cancel the necessary approach to, and treatment of, history as 
an autonomous discipline. The uncritical obsession with interdisciplinarity relegates history to 
the level of a utilitarian database for the erection of the theoretical constructs of the social sci-
ences, fundamentally misunderstanding “the integrity and importance of history as a study of 
man in society in the past”.36 Then, the argument about the lack of any connection between these 
approaches and any “concrete ideology, faction or party” recalls Terry Eagleton’s broadside that 
“ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the other person has”:37 the critics of the “new wave” 
are “ideologically partisan scholars, accustomed to simplifying aphorisms”.38 
The comparative method, which is prescribed as an antidote to Greek historiography’s self-cen-
tredness and parochialism, is supported by enlisting Claudio Pavone’s verdict on the Italian re-
sistance as a civil war, just as the Italian Fascists used to call it for decades, as well as by refer-
ence to a book by an Italian journalist on “the civil war and the violence of the Communist Party” 
of Italy during the liberation period.39 But the reason why this should be the case in the Greek 
context remains nebulous. History is defined in the main as “‘a discipline of context’. It deals 
with a particular problem and a particular set of actors at a particular time in a particular place.” 
The particular and its historical context cannot be ignored simply because the evidence must be 
placed under the seductively impressive dome of a social science model.40 This syncretism is 
akin to the linguistic mechanism of metaphor, which is employed to find similarities among dis-
similarities or, in the best of cases, to compare things that are similar but not identical.41 
The algorithm of violence
One of the key analytical and methodological features of the “new wave” is the emphasis on 
the study of localities (the smaller, the better), the generalisations on the basis of temporal and 
spatial fragments, and a particularly vigilant eye on violence. According to the “new wave”, early 
works of local history appear to suffer from “an inability to generalise from their conclusions, 
though the researchers themselves did not seem to be particularly concerned with doing so”.42 
However, it is not clear how the works of the “new wave” allow that sort of generalisation, even 
though generalisation is stated as constituting its major concern. According to Marantzidis, Ka-
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lyvas’ research “focuses on the region of Argolis, but it attempts to draw conclusions that have 
a more general value”,43 though the reader is left at a loss as to precisely how this is attained. On 
the contrary, it is explicitly stated that local history can “contribute to a new synthesis of the whole 
picture, of the ‘general scheme’”.44 When doubt is cast on the generalising potential of the partial 
and the local, it is admitted that generalisations have nothing to do with conclusions: “what can 
be generalised are the methodological prerequisites of scholarly research on the [Greek] civil 
war”. One of these prerequisites is “the use on the one hand of new theoretical tools (violence 
is one such [tool], though not the only one) and on the other systematic and creative empirical 
research, with objectively measurable data”.45 
Yet the theorisation of violence and its elevation to the key tool obscures the fact that violence 
has been one of the essential building blocks of every political order, and that ideology may re-
strict or facilitate the pursuits of human beings but it does not predetermine them.46 With the 
“theoretical tool” of violence serving as an algorithm,47 reason and necessity are driven out of 
the narrative, and thereby the failures and mistakes and bloodshed perpetrated by the Left were 
not aberrations in an otherwise shining path (which is what “leftist” historiography claimed, ac-
cording to the “new wave”) but plain old communist crimes. Thus the trajectory from the heroic 
paradigm to the narrative of blood and terror conveniently bypasses the Greek Left’s modern-
ising project in the 1940s. Instead, the algorithm of violence and the “red terror” paradigm are 
posited as a complete, closed and self-referential system that is not open to question precisely 
because it is assumed as containing no ambivalent propositions: the numbers of those “slaugh-
tered by the communists”, in Greece and the world over, are thus the only empirical data in the 
history of science that do speak for themselves.
The ‘new wave’ as an unstructured ‘scientific revolution’
The “new wave” launched itself on a platform of provocation, defiance and arrogance that would 
have befitted a version of the Iliad written by Agamemnon, since the “epic” of the 1940s had in its 
view been written by the vanquished Trojans. Invoking the outlook of the poet of the real Iliad is 
illuminating both in terms of repelling the challenge and in terms of its initial formulation by the 
“new wave”. There is a fundamental difference between the Trojan War and the war of the Iliad, 
which Aristotle had already discerned:48 “the Trojan War is eventful, horizontal and victorious; the 
war of the Iliad is tragic, vertical, with no victor.”49 The real war is that of the Iliad, which “refutes 
the traditional end of the ten-year long Trojan War or at least places it under poetic dispute”:50 
whether written by the victors or the vanquished, the Trojan War is simply myth-making. The 
poet of the Iliad resolved the challenge by dividing his sympathies equitably between the Achae-
ans and the Trojans, though with a tinge of empathy towards the latter.51 
The “epic” of the Greek 1940s has proved rather more intractable to handle. The challenge of 
the “new wave” has brought to the fore inadequacies and shortfalls among Greek historians 
at large, and more so among those studying that particular period. In both cases they seem to 
have taken the bait of the provocation, sometimes with the humility of a painful but not particu-
larly effective self-criticism, and sometimes with the sort of political riposte which, even when 
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it is not parochial, it is never systematic enough to stop feeding a sterile cycle of argument and 
counter-argument.52 No doubt, in the course of the past decade the representatives of the “new 
wave” have exposed themselves in manifold ways, epistemologically as well as politically. But 
their audacity has never been particularly risky since it has been supported by a strong media 
nexus which excels in the practice of political paternalism. Still, this audacity was one of the few 
positive offspring of the “new wave” endeavour, and it could be replicated with a view to re-
invigorating academic debate, systematising historiographical criticism in Greece and affording 
the group of specialists on modern Greek history the opportunity to chisel out the features of a 
distinctive scholarly identity. This observation is deliberately intended here to indicate primarily 
the general dysfunctions of the Greek academic system, and less to betray the real intent on the 
part of the authors of this article to absolve themselves of any responsibility for a dynamic that 
ultimately did not fulfil itself. 
If there is a benefit from the relaunch of conservative historiography in the guise of the “new 
wave”, it is that it clearly demonstrates the deadlock of all kinds of attempts to canonise particu-
lar methodological, analytical and interpretative approaches and priorities. The normative dis-
course of the “new wave” aims to impose its own methodological and interpretative doctrine, in 
turn rejecting and promoting research priorities in a manner that is both arbitrary and arrogant: 
for instance, questions such as “‘what was the cause of the end result’”, that is, what were the 
causes of the particular outcome of a particular historical phenomenon, or “what was the ‘real’ 
strategy of the KKE in 1944 or in 1946 . . . were often related to metaphysical matters of limited 
or no real content which served expediencies that are now unrealistic”.53 
If one excludes the traces of audacity and daring embedded in the challenge of the “new wave”, 
historians are left with an off-putting remainder. The rationale which the “new wave” put for-
ward to justify its onslaught on the historiography of the 1940s has largely obscured the other 
terms of its presence, its real scholarly gravitas and a few potentially interesting research ini-
tiatives. All went down under the dominant theme song: we are the “new” because we assert 
something that is different from the dominant historiographical model and we are free of ideol-
ogy because we are not lefties. Apart from the logical gaps endemic in them, what is startling 
in these statements is a quasi-prohibition of alternative ways of reading historical facts which 
envelops them like a mist threatening not so much the historical tribe but Greek society itself. 
This might well signify the passage from the times of ideological debates and arguments, when 
each point of view fortified itself behind its own propositional barricades but at the same time 
recognised the manifest importance of debating rival political points of view, to a time when the 
camera, instead of rising to include other things too, is irredeemably sinking into a single angle 
to the exclusion of all rivals. 
Indeed, energised by the assumption that the dominant “leftist” narrative had moulded the par-
ticular segment of the past into a single true story, the “new wave” came and fragmented the 
segment into numerous and largely incongruous pieces and at the same time imposed on it the 
unity of the old 1943–49 rightwing narrative of the “three rounds”. In so doing it recycled old stuff 
through the fragmentation of space and the unification of time. Developments that are spatial 
and temporal – i.e., occurring at a fragment of space and during a fragment of time – are pro-
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jected across time and across space as having universal applicability and, thereby, validity and 
explanatory power. 
The impressive contrapuntal self-definition of the “new wave” was projected by way of a mani-
festo and banished, without much ado or expert knowledge, the preceding Greek historiogra-
phy on the 1940s to the margins of international historiographical production, while at the same 
time it isolated the Greek Civil War from the international context of the origins of the Cold War; 
paradoxically, the “new wave” was supposed, on its own assertion, to have come with a view to 
blunt such rough edges. Yet how could it do so when, according to its architects, Greek historiog-
raphy appeared to be just throwing away its mothballs and coming out of the closet after a heavy 
winter that had lasted for decades, whereas the Greek Civil War popped up almost as a peculiar-
ly Greek aberration at considerable distance from analogous cases in Europe and elsewhere? 
Inconsistencies such as these, but also the broader internal contradictions of its attempt to re-
juvenate Greek historiography on the 1940s, have not only aggravated the credibility of the “new 
wave” in the context of the scholarly debate but have also affected adversely the formulation and 
the appeal of the response. In the main, they prevented “leftist” historiography from focusing on a 
clear and accurate critical stand. When the endeavour suffers from manifold and obvious weak-
nesses, it is usually difficult to find the ends of the thread and to uncover the aim behind the hap-
hazard treatment of the evidence, especially when the agents of the critical response are diverse 
and clearly fragmented by their own internal arguments and conflicts. “In a word,” as Marc Bloch 
used to say, “the fallacy is clear, and it is only necessary to formulate it in order to destroy it.”54 
The Left in this connection has not formulated the fallacy clearly enough; therefore during the ten 
years that the “new wave” has hit on Greek historiography, its contradictions and the black-out 
over the traces of its twisted historical reading have often worked in its favour, strengthening its 
presence and scattering and disorienting the critique which at first seemed manifestly obvious.
For instance, the “new wave” propagates a shift from the elite to the mass level, and it does so 
by forgetting that what happened in the past, and what we make of it in the present, depends on 
human interaction and agency – what people chose, how they judged, what they did, and what 
ideas they entertained about themselves, the world and others. Instead, the “new wave” founded 
its endeavour largely on criticising other people’s views, steadfastly refusing to budge from the 
temporal and ephemeral assessments of its present. Thus, in historical terms, it seems to have 
never heard of the fundamental choices available to people in most of the world for at least 15 or 
20 years after 1935: fascist or antifascist, in favour of resistance or collaboration, with the com-
munists and their allies or with the capitalists, with the “West” or with the “East”. This weakness, 
which is nothing less than a refusal to look at the past on the past’s own terms, stems from a 
fundamental confusion on the part of the “new wave” between moralising, on the one hand, and 
the assessment of the moral and ideological choices that people made in the past, on the oth-
er.55 Driven by a desire to avoid the former, the “new wave” ultimately rejected the latter, which 
is nonetheless a task for historical scholarship par excellence. As for the reason why it wanted 
to avoid the former, it was perhaps an attempt not to appear to be associated with any “con-
crete ideology, faction or party”; but it was an attempt undermined by the very contrapuntal self-
definition of the “new wave” historiography: since the entire project to rejuvenate the field was 
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based on the rejection of the “leftist” version,56 on the negation of leftist morality and ideology, 
would it not be logical to assume that the “new wave” was simply its rightwing mirror-image? 
This assumption is perfectly valid and legitimate, though it contradicts the claims of the “new wave” 
itself. But the main difficulty is not to be found in the foundational inconsistencies of the “new wave”. 
The negation of the “leftist” narrative sets out from the present to anchor itself in the past in a man-
ner that is unabashedly ideological, thereby delegitimising the historical perspective and outlook. In 
the case of postwar history the tone is set for the historian by two poles which are usually, during 
the course of writing up, mutually exclusive. The first is that of the international postwar dynamics 
which forms the ideal environment for the emotional and ideological involvement of the historian. 
The second is the pole of the Cold War, which, although it temporally appears as the immediate 
outcome of the postwar juncture, analytically exhibits major discontinuities with the preceding pe-
riod. In the broader canvass of postwar history, the years of the Greek Civil War were a transitional 
period, when history passed from one form of dispute to another, when defeated enemies came 
back to haunt their victors and their victims and old friends became foes.
The historian constantly seeks to synthesise realism and ideology in a coherent and cohesive 
narrative which interprets history rather than vindicates it with a lethal overdose of hindsight. 
Scholarly history is in a constant state of argument with the diffuse “collective memory”. There-
fore the historian needs to be able at any moment to control and overcome the intellectual ties 
created between the “we–them” of conventional wisdom and the scholarly historical communi-
ty.57 There is, of course, another solution, and it is an easy one, since it can be put to use immedi-
ately when the historian decides not to address the difficult problem of the relationship between 
history and politics, but instead decides to abolish it and devote himself to his own universe, 
thereby speeding up the end not of politics but of history. A third solution for the vexing issue of 
postwar history is the one selected by the “new wave”: to scuttle history into an unrelenting politi-
cal reality and leave on the surface only those fractals of memory which politics can manipulate. 
Determinism58 and teleology59 as scholarly wisdom 
Epistemologically, part of Greek historiography has been nurtured and raised on a diet of deter-
ministic certainties purporting to be of Marxist stock. There should be no need to recount here 
the rejection by Marx and Engels themselves of the mechanistic and simplistic applications of 
their ideas. The dignity of possibilities needs to be restored to the study of history just as it has 
long ago been restored to the study of the natural world. Physicist Richard Feynman may be of 
use to some historians when he claims that “Nature permits us to calculate only probabilities. Yet 
science has not collapsed.”60 History, in particular, should be written forwards, not backwards,61 
for the simple reasons that (a) it may be told backwards but it is lived forwards;62 and (b) it “is 
determined only as it happens”.63 
Deterministic and teleological interpretations stem from the use (not the abuse; use, in this case, 
is abuse) of hindsight. Yet, in contrast to the effortless and cost-free “wisdom” and “perspicacity” 
of writers and readers, who are ex officio “blessed” with knowing the end of days, in the perfect-
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ly real world of the past “the picture was more uncertain, and other possibilities seemed more 
likely”.64 Even if it was A.J.P. Taylor’s love of provocation that led him to taunt that “in real life the 
inevitable rarely happens”,65 it remains true that what is seen as “inevitable” exists only retro-
spectively as a tool of interpretation rather than one of prognostication.66 In a sense, everything is 
determined, “but it might as well not be, because we can never know what is determined”.67 Pre-
tending otherwise means that hindsight makes the narration of the past a “selective, partisan, 
anthropocentric and mediated undertaking”, as historical questions which are raised a posteriori 
tend to preempt “a future which had not then been written but one which we insist upon seeing 
as preordained . . . If truth by definition encompasses that which might have happened but did 
not, it is also valid that we cannot in any case know what might have happened. And therefore 
we do not have the right either to fear it or feel nostalgic for it.”68 
Possibility, in other words, is inherently connected with reality. “Possibility,” Antonio Gramsci 
wrote, “is not reality: but it is in itself a reality. Whether a man can or cannot do a thing has its 
importance in evaluating what is done in reality. Possibility means ‘freedom’.”69 
Epilogue: Do beans grow upside down?
Critical historiography reminds those who follow it that their ways were made possible by those 
who came before and walked on paths that were different.70 A product of some of those who fol-
lowed was a variety of self-styled “new histories” which emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s and 
had as a major characteristic the study of the multitudes as opposed to the numerically micro-
scopic but economically and politically powerful elites whose actions and writings had until then 
been the almost exclusive preoccupation of historians.71 The outcome was that social-science 
history, microhistory and local history may have rescued the “masses” and the “anonymous” 
ones from what E.P. Thompson dismissed as “the enormous condescension of posterity”, but 
they often ended up reducing “every human being to a statistic, a social type, or the mouthpiece 
of a collective discourse”.72 But it was from Max Weber as well as from Antonio Gramsci that 
historians learnt that ideas, institutions and culture are not simply “the superstructure”; whereas 
on the question of the relationship between history and the “social sciences”, it is worth recalling 
Lawrence Stone’s exhortation that 
it might be time for the historical rats to leave rather than to scramble aboard the social sci-
entific ship which seems to be leaking and undergoing major repair. History has always been 
social, and it was attracted by the siren songs of the social sciences because it thought – per-
haps somewhat mistakenly, it now appears – that they were also scientific.73 
In the case of the Greek “new wave”, the triumphalist self-assertion of its brand of “new history” 
creates the illusion of a neutral and value-free approach and the reality of a new doctrinaire and 
scholastic discourse. Yet the “new” and the “old” are not subject to self-determination, while the in-
citement to enrich the inquiry and the affirmation of the new paradigm are materialising in such a 
manner that “the ‘common’ interpretation of the recent past is . . . composed of the manifold frag-
ments of separate pasts, each of them . . . marked by its own distinctive and assertive victimhood.”74 
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The assertion of victimhood is in itself a form of instrumentalising the past as part of the at-
tempt to shape collective political and social memory through the manipulation of knowledge 
and academic power; and in that game, the demon that haunts Greek historiography, according 
to the “new wave”, is the same demon that is held accountable for the events of December – not 
of December 1944 in Athens but the riots of December 2008 in Athens; it is “the ideology of the 
‘metapolitefsi generation’ which discovered its utopia in the romantic construction of the 1940s: 
in the heroism it sought, the revolution it fantasised, the youth it lost, but also in the convenient 
alibi for the prosaic present it administered.”75
It would be hard to disagree with regard to the fantasies and the political insolvency of that gen-
eration. But the historiographical post-1974 generation does not write en masse books dedi-
cated to “the ghosts of [their] adolescent years” nor is it ignorant of the institutional and practical 
meaning of the term “secretary of state”.76 
It is essential to follow systematically the recent historiography on the history of the Cold War – 
to which the Greek history of the 1940s forms an integral part – in order to grasp that the meth-
odological, analytical and interpretative rigidities and obsessions that are inherent in any canon-
isation attempt widen the gap between home-grown and home-consumed historiography and 
international production. One instance might serve as an allusive postscript: on the art of body-
counting the “victims of communism” at large and in the Soviet Union in particular, and on the 
acrobatics of western Kremlinologists, Moshe Lewin counters that anticommunism is not an an-
alytical tool for the study of Soviet history, much in the same way that the attempt to “‘Stalinise’” 
the entire Soviet phenomenon, as if the USSR had been a vast gulag from 1917 right down to 
1991, is unrealistically bizarre.77 By analogy, nor is anticommunism a scholarly tool for the study 
of Greek history in the 1940s, much in the same way that the communists and their friends then 
had not been members of a mass-murder syndicate or a terrorist mass organisation. 
The political implications of the Greek historiographical “new wave” cannot be ignored and will 
continue to generate debates for as long as history and politics are locked in a never-ending bat-
tle for supremacy, legitimacy and meaning. But politics is one thing. Accuracy is another: 
You would not fulminate quite so much, if you had had my many wild-goose chases af-
ter facts stated by men not trained to scientific accuracy. I often vow to myself that I will 
utterly disregard every statement made by any man who has not shown the world he 
can observe accurately. I wish I had space to tell you a curious History, which I was fool 
enough to investigate on almost universal testimony of Beans growing this year upside 
down. – I firmly believe that accuracy is the most difficult quality to acquire. – I did not, 
however, intend to say all this.78
Nor should we.
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